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Abstract 
Crowd-funding markets have recently emerged as a new source of capital supporting 
entrepreneurial ideas and ventures. In these markets, any individual is capable of 
proposing an idea, and interested others can then contribute funds in support of it. 
Given the recency of crowd-funding’s emergence, participants’ behavior in these 
markets is not yet well understood. From a social influence standpoint, these markets 
are unique because the timing and amount of others’ prior contribution decisions are 
publicly observable. This observable information about prior contributions is therefore 
likely to have an influence on later contribution decisions. We empirically examine this 
notion in a crowd-funded market for online journalism. Bearing in mind that prior 
literature has identified online journalism as a form of public good, we find that funders 
in this marketplace treat one another’s contributions as substitutable, a behavior that 
may be indicative of free riding. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed. 
Keywords: crowd funding; public good; herding behavior; electronic commerce; free riding 
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Introduction 
Crowd-funding platforms have recently emerged as a viable alternative for sourcing capital to support 
innovative, entrepreneurial ideas and ventures (Kappel 2008; Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010). These 
platforms enable entrepreneurs to draw on the crowd, to raise funds from individuals who are interested 
in a proposed project. Proposers can then use the raised funds to see the project through to completion. 
Contributors often benefit from this as proposers typically incentivize contribution, enticing donations or 
investments with offers of sales discounts, for example, once the project enters production. The 
intermediaries that host these platforms then earn revenues from transaction or listing fees1.  
The earliest instantiations of crowd-funding marketplaces supported the creation and production of 
cultural goods (e.g., music, literature or graphic design). For example, Sellaband.com, one of the earliest 
markets, is a Netherlands-based site that supports musical artists, providing them with a venue in which 
to raise funds from the crowd to produce and sell an album (Agarwal et al. 2010).  Recently, however, 
crowd-funded markets have boomed and expanded into many other industry sectors.  Where once these 
markets saw entrepreneurs raising tens to hundreds of dollars in support of their ideas, now marketplaces 
like ProFounder Financial, PeerBackers, KickStarter and IndieGoGo are facilitating much larger 
investments. In particular, Kickstarter.com raised more than $53 million between April, 2009 and March, 
2011 (Strickler 2011), while ProFounder.com has reported average individual investments on the order of 
$1,300, with entrepreneurs raising upwards of $30,000 from the broader community toward an average 
project. However, because of the recency of this phenomenon’s online emergence, work examining the 
behavior of crowd-funding participants is lacking. This is problematic given the volume and worth of 
transactions taking place in these settings, as well as the growth in both the prevalence and viability of 
these markets across industries.   
One of the most novel aspects of crowd-funded markets is the nature of publicly observable popularity 
indicators that are typically recorded and published for consideration by participants.  While a number of 
recent studies, such as that by Tucker and Zhang (2011), have considered electronic marketplaces that 
provide users with popularity indicators, the nature of crowd-funded markets is such that the popularity 
indicators are deeper and more complex. In particular, information on prior contributions typically 
includes a timestamp as well as the specific amount contributed. Leveraging this publicly observable 
information, we seek to identify the dimensions of others’ prior behavior that are of influence, as well as to 
empirically identify which of those dimensions are of greatest influence. 
We examine the aforementioned aspects in the context of a crowd-funded online marketplace that 
supports journalists, enabling them to pitch article ideas to the crowd and to then raise the money 
necessary to research and publish a piece. We consider the influence of observable information about 
prior contribution on others’ subsequent contribution behavior2.  In doing so, we bear in mind that online 
journalism has been considered a form of public good in the literature (Aitamurto 2011; Hamilton 2003; 
Kaye and Quinn 2010)3. Because of this, larger contributions by earlier funders toward the good’s 
production might drive decreases in later contributions, if individuals choose to free ride.  At the same 
time, we also focus upon the potential for herding in contributions, as the occurrence of herding is directly 
                                                             
1 It is important to point out that the crowd-funding platform we will consider in our empirical setting is 
run by a non-profit organization, thus fees are not charged to participants. Further, at the time of our data 
collection, no direct incentives were being offered to contributors by project proposers. 
2 As detailed in later sections, the journalists have joined the website in order to pitch ideas for articles 
and to raise funds to conduct the work. The contributors then benefit from articles being published that 
they have an interest in reading. To attract funds, the journalists draft a pitch of their story idea, along 
with a list of their qualifications and planned deliverables. Journalists can communicate generally with 
the potential contributors in the community by posting upon their blog and posting comments on stories 
or pitches. 
3 It is also important to note here that Aitamurto’s work examined the motivations of contributors in the 
crowd-funding market from which our empirical data is drawn. She found that contributors perceive their 
project donations to be contributions toward a greater social good. 
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associated with users’ observation of, and reaction to, others’ prior decisions (Banerjee 1992). Further, 
empirical examples exist in the literature of herding in private contribution toward public goods (Borck et 
al. 2006; Nandi and Rochelandet 2008; Xia et al. 2011). Therefore, the main research question that we 
address here is: What effects do observable indicators of others’ prior contribution 
decisions have on later users’ contribution decisions? 
While some prior research has sought to identify patterns of herding behavior in investment contexts, our 
empirical setting is quite different because the product in question is a type of public good (Aitamurto 
2011; Hamilton 2003; Kaye and Quinn 2010; Samuelson 1954). As a result, these “investments” are better 
viewed as philanthropic contributions.  Because of this, the pattern of contributions in the funding of a 
news article is likely to diverge from the observed investment behavior documented in prior empirical 
work, given that any individual may be inclined to free ride on the contributions of others (i.e., reading the 
published article at no cost).  An ideal scenario for any given individual, then, would be for others to fund 
the project and for said individual to then reap the rewards by consuming the output, free of charge.   
Our setting is also novel because the majority of crowd-funded marketplaces provide users with the ability 
to observe a project’s current ‘funding status’. Similar in purpose to preference indicators in other 
marketplaces, such as click-through, purchase or download rates, this status encompasses prior funding 
decisions made by others in the marketplace in regard to a particular project. However, this funding 
status offers the observer a richer set of information than more common preference indicators. The 
information supplied includes not only whether an individual chose to supply funds, but also when they 
supplied those funds and the amount that was supplied. Because of these rich signals, crowd-funded 
markets are rife with the potential for social influence, as it is much easier for an observer to compare the 
contributions of prior others to one another, as well as to their own potential contribution.   
Drawing on the aforementioned novel aspects of crowd-funding preference indicators, we define two new 
measures that capture holistic aspects of published preference information. In particular, these measures 
reflect the timing and size of prior contributions. We define contribution frequency as the average 
amount (in dollars) contributed per period at a given point in time, which reflects the rate at which a story 
receives funding, and we define contribution density as the number of unique contributors per dollar of 
funding received as of a given point of time, which we believe reflects the intensity of support for a pitch in 
the marketplace (i.e., the general commitment of contributors to the project). In addition to these 
complex popularity indicators, our data set is particularly novel in that it also includes web traffic 
statistics, which allow us to factor the prior behavior of the potential crowd-funders into our analysis, 
considering the number of pitch URL views at the time of a given observation period.  
We seek to extend much of the recent work on private contribution toward a public good, which has been 
conducted in the context of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks (Asvanund et al. 2004; Gu et al. 
2009; Krishnan et al. 2002; Xia et al. 2011).  We do so in a few key ways. First, we consider a novel 
product type, online journalism, a cultural and experience good. Second, as noted above, we consider 
deeper measures of adoption here, noting that in our context indications of contribution by prior others 
include both temporality and intensity, captured by timestamps and proffered dollar amounts.  Third, we 
consider a context in which the contribution made by others is readily apparent to a potential contributor. 
To clarify this point, unlike P2P file sharing networks, where generally users can merely identify the 
number of other users on the network at a particular point in time who are offering a shared file, users 
here can view, quite clearly, the total population of others that have contributed before them toward the 
specific unit under consideration (the pitch), when they contributed, as well as the degree to which they 
contributed.   
The main results of our analysis are as follows: we find support for the notion that users contribute in 
accordance with the idea that they are funding a public good. More specifically, as they observe others 
contributing more frequently toward a given project, the amount they are inclined to contribute falls (an 
increase of 1% in the frequency of contribution is associated with a 0.26% decrease in subsequent 
contribution). Similarly, as they observe others contributing in greater amounts, the amount they are 
inclined to contribute falls (an increase of 1% in the density of contribution is associated with a 5.11% 
increase in subsequent contribution). This would seem to suggest that individuals view their contributions 
and those of others as substitutable, which also indicates that participants may free ride to some degree in 
this marketplace.  
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In the following sections, we begin with a review of the relevant literature pertaining to crowd-funding 
markets, public goods and herding behavior. Then, based on the reviewed literature, we discuss our 
expectations of the influence of contribution behavior on subsequent contributors. Finally, we present 
details of our empirical evaluation and a discussion of the implications of our findings for both 
practitioners and scholars dealing with crowd-funding markets. 
Literature Review 
Crowd-funding 
There is a small stream of research that has examined the concept of crowd-funded markets.  
Schwienbacher and Larralde (2010) define crowd-funding as “the financing of a project or a venture by a 
group of individuals instead of professional parties.”  These authors provide an overview of the concept 
based on an earlier review (Belleflamme et al. 2010), noting the still embryonic stage of the phenomenon’s 
emergence.  Schwienbacher and Larralde indicate that a number of platforms have arisen in support of 
crowd-funding online over the last 4-6 years.  The earliest successful example is Sellaband.com (Agarwal 
et al. 2010), a Dutch-based marketplace in which musical artists raise funds to produce and sell an album.  
Agarwal et al. (2010) examine this marketplace to evaluate the influence of proximity, amongst other 
factors, on individual investment behavior, re-evaluating the “flat-world hypothesis.” Another prominent 
example of a crowd-funding marketplace is the peer-to-peer lending site Prosper.com. Drawing on data 
from Propser.com, Lin et al. (2009) seek to identify novel forms of information that individuals consider 
in crowd-funded marketplaces when making investment or contribution decisions.  These authors 
conclude that the likelihood of credit being issued is greater when the borrower exhibits greater social 
capital (e.g., a larger social network), as lenders appear to take this as a sign of credibility or 
trustworthiness.    
While the literature on the topic of crowd-funding is quite limited, there is also a wide body of related 
work. Of particular note is the stream of research that that has examined the effects of popularity or 
preference indicators on consumers’ adoption decisions. Tucker and Zhang (2011), examining how online 
consumers’ wedding vendor adoption decisions are influenced by the provision of prior adoption 
statistics, find that these statistics cause the formation of a ‘steep tail’, attracting new outsiders to what 
was previously a niche product choice. Duan et al. (2009), considering users’ downloads of free software 
from download.com, observe severe changes in software download rates when published product 
rankings shift, suggesting that consumers take prior downloads as a signal of product approval and 
quality.  Thus, published indicators of prior users’ preferences have been found to have a major influence 
on subsequent deciders.   
Interestingly, prior work has noted that this social influence can also take the form of anti-herding, or 
contrarian behavior. For example, multiple scholars have noted that financial advisors often make 
recommendations contrary to the mainstream in order to stand out from competition, or to appear as 
though they hold some private information that others do not (Drehmann et al. 2005; Levy 2004). 
However, what might, on the surface, appear to be anti-herding or contrarian behavior can also manifest 
if individuals perceive others’ contributions and their own as direct substitutes (i.e., if individuals perceive 
that they are dealing with a public good and then free ride on the contributions of others).  This is 
particularly relevant in our study context because we are dealing with private contribution toward online 
journalism articles that are freely accessible on the Internet once published. Journalism of this sort has 
been suggested to constitute a public good (Hamilton 2003; Kaye and Quinn 2010). Further, and perhaps 
more importantly, prior work has documented that contributors in the crowd-funded market from which 
our data is drawn perceive that they are contributing toward a public good (Aitamurto 2011). In the 
following section, we therefore elaborate upon the mechanisms underlying free riding behavior in 
contributions toward public goods. 
Public Goods 
A public good is traditionally defined as one that is both non-excludable in supply and non-rival in 
demand (Samuelson 1954).  In many cases, articles published online by the media are freely accessible to 
all.  Thus, one’s private contribution to the production of such material ultimately may provide benefit to 
the masses. The logic behind this behavior is partly explained by a stream of literature dealing with the 
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(impure) altruism and the warm glow effect (Andreoni 1990). In these models, individuals allocate their 
resources between contributions to private and public goods. The reason they contribute to public goods, 
it is argued, is that they derive some utility from aiding others (i.e., a warm glow feeling). However, as the 
level of others’ contributions rises, the volume of public goods that are available increases in turn. As a 
result, the public’s utility increases, thus the marginal benefit of an individual contributing falls. As a 
result, the individual will tend to reallocate their funds more toward private consumption activities as this 
takes place, a behavior also known as free riding (Roberts 1984; Warr 1982).  
Further, Andreoni (1998) has shown that when the provision of a public good is dependent upon 
aggregate contribution exceeding some threshold (as is the case in crowd-funding markets), individuals 
will be likely to treat their contributions and those of others as substitutes. Simply put, if one sees that 
others’ contributions are surpass the threshold, then one’s own contribution is no longer integral and thus 
it can be decreased without much loss in utility. Alternatively, if others are not contributing enough, the 
value of one’s own contribution becomes higher. 
In the information systems literature, public goods have been studied in a variety of contexts. Wasko et al. 
(2009) examine the structural and social characteristics of online networks of practice that sustain 
contribution toward a shared repository of knowledge and best-practices.  These authors find that 
contribution toward the public good is largely maintained by a mechanism of generalized exchange. 
Asvanund et al. (2004) argue that P2P networks meet the criteria of a public good. These authors argue 
and empirically demonstrate that individuals’ likelihood of contributing to a P2P file sharing network 
decreases as more individuals join the network. Yet, empirical work examining individuals’ contribution 
to P2P file sharing networks has not produced entirely consistent findings.  In particular, Xia et al. (2011) 
also examine patterns of individual contribution in P2P music file-sharing networks and find that 
individuals are more likely to continue contributing if they receive greater benefits from the network, 
reflecting a reciprocal relationship. Also examining P2P file sharing networks, Gu et al. (2009) similarly 
find evidence of a social norm of reciprocity in participants contribution behavior. In contrast to private 
models of contribution, which predict free riding, these findings are more in line with conditional 
cooperation or fairness models of public good contribution.  In such models, the expectation is that 
individuals will observe the behavior of others and then respond in what they perceive to be a ‘fair’ or 
reciprocal manner. Thus, if others contribute more, they are inclined to respond in kind by contributing 
more as well. This strategic mimicry might appear to be a form of herding to an objective observer.  With 
this in mind, in the following section we turn our discussion to the subject of ‘band-wagoning’ or 
‘herding’. 
Herding Behavior 
The findings of Xia et al. (2011) and Gu et al. (2009) are not unique; other work has also found evidence 
of positive reinforcement in contributions toward a public good. In fact, again in the P2P file sharing 
context, Nandi and Rochelandet (2008) find that the behavior of individuals on these networks is poorly 
determined by private models of contribution, in that participants do not appear to free ride. Rather, they 
again suggest that individuals are primarily motivated by a general sense of reciprocity.  However, in this 
case, the reciprocal behavior is tied to the diversity of provided content, rather than the volume. 
Reciprocal behavior has also been found in the context of private contribution toward the provision of 
online journalism. Borck et al. (2006) examine factors influencing individuals’ voluntary contribution of 
funds in support of a German online newsletter.  These authors find that contributors provide what they 
consider to be a fair amount, based on the contributions made by others.   
Copying others’ decisions may be logical for a variety of other reasons as well. Individuals may benefit 
from coordinating their decisions with others. Further, by listening to, reading, or watching the same 
things, actors can pursue common interests, around which they can interact, fostering a sense of 
belonging or community (Adler 2006; Salganik and Watts 2009). From this perspective, popular products 
might be expected to become more popular, leading to ‘cumulative advantage’ or a ‘winner-take-all’ 
scenario. This search for commonality is conceptually similar to individuals’ search for community or 
social identity, which Forman et al. (2008) consider as a possible explanation for their finding that 
consumers are more likely to favor an online product review when the reviewer discloses identifying 
information, and, further, when that information indicates that the reviewer lives in closer proximity to 
the consumer.  Thus, it appears that social influence can have a profound effect on user decisions and 
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product success. Using Internet-based and lab-based experiments, Salganik et al. (2006) and Hanson and 
Putler (1996) provide further support for this, showing that users follow others extensively in their 
decision making behavior.    
Copying others may also make sense in the presence of information uncertainty. To deal with this 
uncertainty, actors may rely on proxy indicators of the privately held information of others, such as 
others’ decisions to purchase or adopt a product. Reliance upon such indicators is the traditionally 
accepted source of herding behavior and informational cascades (Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani and 
Hirshleifer 1992; Bikhchandani et al. 1998; Kübler and Weizsacker 2004). When users take the behavior 
of preceding others as a signal of the efficacy of that behavior, the strength of this signal (e.g., number of 
actors exhibiting the same behavior) can increase to the point where observers begin disregarding their 
own private information entirely. When this happens, all subsequent deciders may be inclined to follow 
suit, engaging in the observed behavior (Banerjee 1992). Given the richness of the popularity indicators 
and contribution signals provided in crowd-funded markets, it is readily apparent that they are rife with 
the potential for social influence. Drawing on published preference indicators in these settings, 
individuals are easily able to assess the contributions made by others when formulating their decision. To 
clarify the nature of the supplied information, in the following section we provide details of the 
marketplace and the available indicators. 
Study Context 
In this section we detail our study context in order to make clear the relevance of the above discussion and 
to provide a basis of understanding for the subsequent empirical analysis.  The market we consider is a 
crowd-funding platform (Agarwal et al. 2010; Kappel 2008; Schwienbacher and Larralde 2010) based in 
San Francisco, California, which was established in November of 2008. The site enables new and 
established journalists to crowd-source capital in support of their work by pitching their ideas to the 
community, just as an entrepreneur would pitch venture capitalists. The site functions as follows: 
individuals first register to become members of the community. Members can then establish a profile 
page where they can provide details about themselves along with a photograph and a link to a personal 
website.   
Once a member, anyone in the community can choose to pitch a story to other members of the 
community4. A pitch includes a description of the story topic, the proposer’s qualifications, as well as a list 
of planned deliverables and a budget. Other members of the community can then choose to contribute 
funds toward the pitch in any increment they wish. The contribution phase continues in this manner until 
the story is completed and published. Community members’ preferences are indicated to others by their 
observable contribution history. When reviewing a pitch, a list of all prior contributors is provided to the 
reader, along with their specific contribution amounts, the date and time of their contribution, as well as 
the aggregate contribution that has been made up to that point by all community members.  
While prior work has examined the role of informational cascades in driving herding behavior (Duan et al. 
2009), where adopters herd because the signal produced by others’ prior adoption decisions overwhelms 
the significance of any private information they might have, in our case, the impact of observable prior 
decisions is likely to be much more complex. This is because, as noted previously, we are dealing with a 
public good, as well as deep, complex preference indicators.  
The published news articles may provide contributors with some direct utility, as these individuals can 
obtain information or entertainment that they seek from the article author’s work; however, the articles in 
our study context are also perceived by contributors to be a public good (Aitamurto 2011), thus funders 
obtain further additional from performing an altruistic act, as their donations benefit others. Thus, there 
are potentially countervailing effects here. Contributors may free ride if they perceive their contributions 
                                                             
4 It is important to note that very few members of the marketplace act as both contributors and authors, 
even though this is possible. Of the 4,515 unique contributors present in our dataset, only 72 are authors 
contributing to the pitches of others. A notable implication of this is that contribution behavior cannot be 
attributed to a tit-for-tat strategy. 
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The herding literature provides relatively strong support for the idea that observable popularity indicators 
will have a positive effect on users’ decisions to contribute. That is, in observing others’ prior contribution 
decisions, a given individual is increasingly likely to be convinced to follow suit. In fact, according to prior 
literature, such outcomes are expected to manifest amongst rational decision-makers even though they 
are likely aware of the potential for herding to occur (Kennedy 2002).  This could occur because 
observation of collective agreement by a group of others may be taken as a signal that the market at large 
expects high quality output on the part of the journalist. This inference is necessary, as the observer is not 
directly aware of others’ private information and can therefore only guess at the nature of that 
information based on the observed actions. In contrast, however, the public goods literature suggests that, 
in dealing with a public good, individual contributors will lessen their contributions as others contribute 
more, as others’ contributions are seen as substituting for one’s own. Further, because others’ 
contributions are substitutes for one’s own, it is an easy matter to sit back and free ride on the 
contributions of others. With this contradiction in mind, our model thus seeks to determine which of 
these logics predominates in this context. 
In considering recent literature that has examined herding behavior in online contexts, it is readily 
apparent that signals emitted by contributors in our setting are relatively more complex. This is because 
the vast majority of empirical studies that have examined herding have looked at adoption decisions, 
which are binary (e.g., Duan et al. 2009; Tucker and Zhang 2011). In our case, however, preference is 
indicated with varying intensity as funders provide different contribution amounts. Further, merely 
considering others’ decisions to contribute is a relatively simplistic view of the information processing 
that is likely to take place. In particular, an observer is quite likely to consider the temporal aspects of the 
contribution decision. The reason for this is that, upon viewing a pitch, a user is provided with a clear 
indication of how long that pitch has been posted for consideration. Further, the observer is also 
presented with a summary of the total funds raised by that pitch to date and the total number of 
individuals that have contributed to date. Based on these three values (the posting date, number of 
supporters and total funds raised), a potential contributor is capable of forming an impression of how 
quickly funds are coming in and how many supporters have been involved.  
With this in mind, as noted in the introduction, we define two alternative measures of herding that are 
appropriate to our context, capturing all observable information. First, addressing temporal aspects, we 
define contribution frequency as the number of dollars contributed per period, over the duration of a 
pitch’s funding in the marketplace. As an example, a pitch that has been posted for 10 days and received 
$20 in funding would have a contribution frequency of 2.00. Second, to capture the intensity of 
contributors’ approval, we define contribution density as the number of contributors per dollar of funding 
received. Again, as an example, a pitch that has received $20 to date and has 5 unique contributors would 
have a contribution density of 0.25.  The contribution frequency reflects the rate at which funds are being 
raised by the pitch, as of a given point in time, while the density reflects the intensity of contribution; an 
increase in this value reflects a lower intensity of contribution per capita (i.e., individual contributors 
providing a lower proportion of the pitch budget).  
Based on the above, a greater frequency of support may signal the expected quality of the final published 
article to other users, or, in contrast, it may cause users to withhold funds and free ride.  If users do tend 
to herd, observing higher frequencies of prior contribution should result in an increased likelihood of 
funding at a particular point in time, whereas a negative effect would be associated with free riding. The 
effect of contribution density on subsequent contribution is slightly more complex. On the one hand, a 
higher density implies that individual users have contributed in relatively limited amounts and thus an 
observer might perceive their faith in the journalist as limited and respond in kind (i.e., if users observe 
that others have contributed in limited amounts, they would follow suit and contribute in limited amounts 
as well). Based on this, we might expect that higher densities will be associated with lower levels of 
subsequent contribution. However, once more, as we are dealing with a public good, users may pick up 
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the slack and contribute greater funds to compensate for others’ lack of contribution. Further, setting 
aside the fact that this is a public good, users may simply place less stock in large contributions, as they 
may perceive these as instances of self-support on the part of the author, or as contributions made by the 
author’s family and friends.  
In addition to the above elements, we expect a number of other factors, reflecting potential contributors’ 
prior behaviors, to influence their ultimate decision about whether to contribute and how much to 
contribute. In particular, the number of individuals viewing a pitch is likely to reflect general interest in 
the topic. Thus, web traffic statistics capturing the number of page views are also included in our model as 
contribution predictors. We further include the lag of contribution as a predictor, as this is expected to 
capture word of mouth effects (Duan et al. 2009) and explicit communication between marketplace 
members. While the focus of this study is on the influence of preference indicators and the predictive 
power of prior user behavior, we also consider some important pitch characteristics associated with 
contribution behavior in our analysis. This is done in order to control for their effects, thereby resulting in 
a more comprehensive model. We include the number of dollars of the pitch’s required budget that 
remain outstanding as of a given time period and the physical location of the pitch on the main 
marketplace web page (presentation position). The impact of potential contributors’ awareness of the 
outstanding budget for a given pitch is difficult to predict. A greater volume of funds required may result 
in a desire to assist the author. Alternatively, this may be perceived as somewhat of an insurmountable 
goal, and thus pitches may have a harder time attracting initial funding. The order in which pitches are 
presented to the user is quite likely to influence whether they are considered and, as such, whether they 
receive contributions. In particular, twelve pitches are listed per page on the marketplace website. The 
default ordering of these pitches is based on recency, with the most recently posted pitch being presented 
first. Due to the effects of primacy (Haugtvedt and Wegener 1994), one would then expect that pitches 
presented to the user first are more likely to receive contribution.  We therefore account for this effect in 
our model, including a dichotomous variable that reflects whether a pitch was one of the twelve most 
recent postings as of a given date (i.e., whether it was automatically presented to the user, being among 
the pitches listed on the default landing page)5. Lastly, in order to ensure our model is identified, we also 
must account for exogenous sources of influence on contribution behavior, such as the pitch topic’s 
popularity in the mainstream media and on the broader Internet.  
We address these factors in two ways: first, we consider the number of page referrals to the crowd-funding 
marketplace from external sources such as search engines, Facebook links, e-mail links and the like, at the 
time of a given observation. Such referrals are in contrast to those page visits that stemmed from 
individuals manually accessing the marketplace by directly typing the URL into their web browser.  A 
greater number of external referral visits would reflect greater societal popularity of the article content 
posted on the marketplace website. Second, we include results from Google Search trends for each 
observation, employing 2-5 keywords that were manually extracted from each pitch. Again, the prevalence 
of individuals searching for these topics on Google, on a given day, is expected to capture the broader 
popularity of the article content in society. While not a perfect indicator of marketplace participants’ 
interest in topics, it is reasonable to assume that these individuals will be exposed to societal trends in 
general, thus Google Search trends data should be a reasonable proxy for the marketplace’s interests. 
Table 1 provides a list of variables we use in our model, along with their definitions. 
                                                             
5 The observable quality of a pitch is obviously an important factor as well. We therefore sought to address 
observable variations in pitch quality by including a variable that reflects the volume of pitch deliverables 
(i.e., the character length of the pitch deliverables section), as well as a variable capturing the presence of 
a peer reviewer.  However, these factors were not statistically significant in the empirical models and did 
not influence the sign or significance of our other variables. Hence they were excluded for the sake of 
parsimony.   
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Model 
All non-categorical variables in our analysis are log transformed, thereby allowing us to identify 
percentage changes in effect.  This was deemed appropriate primarily because pitches’ required budgets 
and daily contributions, as well as the popularity of different stories, vary widely, thus understanding 
contribution effects in percentage terms is significantly more useful (Keene 1995). For a given pitch, i, on 
a given day, t, the final, complete model is captured by equation (1). Here, the final three terms represent 
a vector of date fixed effects, for each day in the sample, which controls for changes in the marketplace 
over time6, a vector of pitch-level fixed effects, addressing unobservable heterogeneity between pitches, 
and an error term, respectively7. 
 
                
 
log(contributionit )= β1 * log( frequencyit )+β2 * log(densityit )+
β3 * log(contributioni(t−1))+β4 * log(pitch _url _ viewsit )+
β5 * log(remaining_ budgetit )+β6 * focal _ pageit +
β7 * log(referralsit )+αi +φt +εit
                   (1) 
 
Our evaluation of the model is conducted via time series regression employing the Arellano-
Bover/Blundell-Bond System-based Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) estimator (Arellano and 
Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998), an extension of the original Arellano-Bond Difference-based GMM 
(DGMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991). This estimator allows one to instrument for a lagged 
dependent variable using available higher order lags. For the sake of clarity, it is important to point out 
the benefits of the SGMM estimator over the DGMM estimator. The DGMM estimator is the original 
estimator that was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This estimator treats the model as a system of 
equations, one per time period. As such, the equations differ only in their moment condition sets. 
However, Arellano and Bover (1995), as well as Blundell and Bond (1998), later noted that lagged levels 
could be weak instruments for first differences if the autoregressive process is too persistent over time, as 
is possible in our case.  In order to address this issue, these authors proposed the SGMM estimator, which 
                                                             
6 To clarify, changes in the marketplace over time might include things such as seasonality effects (e.g., 
contributors having lower volumes of disposable income in the tax season). 
7 We do not incorporate author fixed effects into our model as the vast majority of authors in our sample 
have pitched only a single story.  As such, author fixed effects are highly collinear with pitch fixed effects 
and lead to qualitatively similar results. 
Table 1. Antecedents Variable Definitions 
1. contribution Total dollars contributed to a pitch on a particular day. 
2. remaining_budget A given pitch’s total budget outstanding as of a given day. 
3. frequency Total amount raised divided by days of funding ($/day). 
4. density Total number of contributors divided by dollars raised (contributors/$). 
5. pitch_url_views Number of pitch views on a given day. 
6. focal_page Binary indication of whether pitch is presented on main web page. 
7. search_trends  Google search trends associated with story keywords. 
8. referrals Number of page visits referred from external Internet sources.  
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adds the original model equations back into the system. By doing this, one is able to simultaneously 
instrument for differences with lagged levels and for levels with lagged differences (Ghose 2009).  
Admittedly, however, higher order lagged variables might not be ideal instruments since it is possible to 
have common demand shocks correlated over time, in which case lagged variables would be correlated 
with the current period demand shock. However, common demand shocks correlated over time are 
conceptually similar to trends. Hence, a suitable control for correlated demand shocks or trends can 
alleviate this problem in the GMM estimation (Archak et al. 2011). Our web site referrals control variable 
thus alleviates any potential concerns in this regard, as does our re-estimation using Google Search 
Trends.  
Finally, in order to alleviate any concerns about a high instrument count in our SGMM estimations 
(Roodman 2009), we use a collapsed instrument set comprised only of low order lags. This approach was 
deemed appropriate as it has been shown to produce more reliable results in scenarios where the 
instrument count is on the higher side (Mehrhoff 2009).  
Dataset 
We collected our data from a variety of sources. First, the purveyor of the marketplace provided us with 
access to proprietary data in the form of web traffic statistics for the marketplace via a Google Analytics 
account. Using this account, one of the authors developed a piece of software to programmatically retrieve 
time series data of web traffic statistics for each URL of the website, by day, leveraging the Google 
Analytics Data Export API. A similar approach was used to obtain time series data on external page 
referrals (i.e., unique website visits initiated from external sources, such as web pages or e-mail links). 
Second, we developed a software application to retrieve all available public information from the website 
about pitch and story characteristics, such as the date on which a pitch was proposed, the amount of 
funding received on any given day, who contributed to a pitch and the amount of each contribution, the 
required budget outstanding for a pitch as of a given day, whether a pitch was located on the default 
landing page of the marketplace as of a given point in time, the date an associated story was published by 
the author, etc. Finally, one of the authors manually retrieved time series data on Google search trends for 
3-5 keywords associated with each pitch and story. Our data set includes every contribution made in the 
marketplace from March of 2009 until January of 2011, as well as web traffic statistics, by URL, by date, 
spanning August of 2009 to January of 2011. The timeline diagram provided in Figure 1 clarifies the 












As per the diagram we consider only those pitch contribution observations (aggregate contribution by all 
users, in a particular pitch, on a particular day; pitch-day pairs) that took place on or after August 26, 
2009, in order to ensure the availability of web traffic details associated with URL views.  Of the 154 
pitches that received some contribution in the marketplace over this period, 100 completed the funding 
process during the period of observation and are thus considered in our analysis. Of the $126,654.97 
contributed in the marketplace over this period, these 100 pitches accounted for $66,016.21, supplied by a 
 
Figure 1.  Dataset Timeline 
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total of 4,353 contributors. Based on this, contribution appears to be distributed across pitches in a 
reasonably uniform manner, with 65% of the pitches receiving 52% of the funding. The remaining 
variables we include in our analysis are the required budget outstanding for a pitch as of a given 
observation, whether a pitch was located on the default landing page of the marketplace as of a given 
point in time (i.e., 12 most recent), Google Search trends for associated pitch keywords and the number of 
external URL referrals to the marketplace. A pitch enters our sample on August 26, 2009, or when it is 
initially posted for consideration, whichever is most recent.  The pitch then exits on the date an associated 
story is published. We present the descriptive statistics of all the variables in Table 2. 
 
The average pitch takes 54.5 days to complete the funding process, though there is considerable variation, 
with the fastest pitch having completed funding in 1 day, while the slowest completed funding in 294 days. 
The average completed pitch receives funds from 40 unique contributors. However, once again, there is 
considerable variation around the mean, with the number of contributors ranging from 1 to 175.  This is 
understandable, however, as at the time of data collection, the pitches observed have raised from as little 
as $20 to as much as $7,685.  Thus, the number of contributors required to supply these funds will vary 
quite a bit.  The average individual contribution is $6.01 and contributions range from $0.28 to $4,749.    
Results 
The results of our model estimation are presented in Table 3, column 1.  We find that contribution 
frequency has a significant negative effect (β4=-0.26; p < 0.05), while contribution density has a 
significant positive effect (β3=5.11; p < 0.01). These estimates are robust to the use of several control 
variables such as focal page, remaining budget, search trends and website referrals, as can be seen in 
columns 2 to 4. Based on these estimated coefficients, a 1% increase in prior contribution frequency is 
associated with a 0.26% decrease in contribution.  Similarly, a 1% increase in density is associated with a 
5.11% increase in contribution. This suggests that higher contribution frequencies are associated with 
lower subsequent contribution amounts, as are lower contribution densities. Thus it appears that 
individuals in this marketplace perceive others’ contributions as substitutes for their own, causing them to 
reallocate their resources accordingly. Further, this is suggestive of free riding behavior, though it may 
also simply indicate that contributors place less stock in large prior contributions made by others, perhaps 
because they perceive such contributions to be biased (e.g., self-support, or contributions by friends and 
family), a phenomenon considered by Agarwal et al. (2010) in the context of Sellaband.com. The effect of 
prior period contribution is significant and positive (β5=0.30; p < 0.01).  More specifically, a 1% increase 
in the volume of prior period contribution is associated with a 0.30% increase in subsequent contribution.  
Moving next to our pitch URL traffic variables, we again find significant results.  In particular, we find 
that the presence of greater numbers of users viewing a pitch on a given day is associated with more 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 Min Max Mean Standard Dev 
1. contribution 0.00 4,749.00 1,123.87 85.52 
2. remaining_budget 0.00 38,468.22 2,059.44 6400.59 
3. frequency 0.00 500.00 14.58 31.33 
4. density 0.00 0.50 0.08 0.06 
5. pitch_url_views 0.00 692.00 9.13 20.85 
6. search_trends 0.00 100.00 45.19 28.19 
7. referrals 57.00 6,967.00 763.37 654.23 
8. focal_page 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 
Notes:  
N = 5,874, all continuous variables are log-transformed in the analyses. 
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money being contributed (β6=1.27; p < 0.001).  That is, a 1% increase in the number of pitch views is 
associated with a 1.27% increase in contributions, a rather intuitive result. With regard to our control 
variables (i.e., remaining budget and physical pitch placement), we find no significant effects. While 
surprising, the insignificance of the focal_page factor (pitch placement) is possibly due to the availability 
of sorting options the user is presented with when considering pitches.  To elaborate, the user is able to 
drill down into those pitches that have received no funding or are closest to completing funding, thus the 
default page ordering may be of little consequence.  
Finally, regarding our controls for story topic popularity on the Internet, we find that the website referrals 
variable produces a significant positive effect (β11=0.29; p < 0.001).  This suggests that a greater 
popularity of story content upon the broader Internet is associated with more contribution toward the 
focal pitch.  This is also in keeping with models of public goods, as it suggests that individuals respond to 
popular topics with greater contribution, perhaps because they feel they are servicing a greater public 
good (obtaining a greater marginal benefit from contributing). Our estimates are qualitatively similar 
across all hierarchical regressions, thus our coefficients appear to be quite stable estimates. Further, the 
Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected in any of our regressions (Chi2 (3) = 0.13), 
and the difference in Hansen test does not allow us to reject the exogeneity of our instrument variable set 
(which notably includes our frequency and density variables). 
 
Discussion 
The empirical study conducted herein presents a unique effort to analyze social effects online. While other 
scholars have recently examined private contribution toward a public good in the context of communities 
of practice (Wasko et al. 2009) and peer to peer file sharing networks (Asvanund et al. 2004; Krishnan et 
al. 2002; Nandi and Rochelandet 2008; Xia et al. 2011), this work advances the literature, examining 
Table 3. Results of Antecedents Model: Pitch-Day (System-GMM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
frequency -0.26* (0.12) -0.26* (0.12) -0.26* (0.11) -0.26* (0.11) 
density 5.11** (1.61) 4.79** (1.69) 4.61** (1.62) 3.03+ (1.73) 
contribution(t-1) 0.30** (0.09) 0.30** (0.09) 0.30** (0.09) 0.30** (0.09) 
url_views 1.27*** (0.10) 1.28*** (0.10) 1.28*** (0.10) 1.22*** (0.10) 
focal_page -- -0.12 (0.11) -0.11 (0.11) -0.04 (0.10) 
remaining_budget -- -0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) -0.00 (0.03) 
search_trends -- -- -0.05 (0.05) -- 
referrals -- -- -- 0.29*** (0.07) 
Observations 5,774 5,774 5,774 5,774 
Wald Chi2 467.98 (4) 622.84 (6) 627.66 (7) 608.52 (7) 
AR(3) -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 
Hansen J 0.13 (3) 0.12 (3) 0.11 (3) 0.05 (3) 
Notes: 
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05; + p < 0.10. 
Robust standard errors in brackets for coefficients, degrees of freedom in brackets 
for test statistics. 
Lag of contribution instrumented using higher order lags. 
Difference-in-Hansen tests are insignificant for all models (i.e., instrument sets are 
exogenous). 
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contribution behavior around a new product type (online journalism), subject to the influence of 
observable contribution decisions made by prior others. Further still, the credibility of our findings is 
improved by the fact that we are able to control for web traffic and product popularity, drawing on web 
traffic statistics and Google Insights for Search data.   
The availability of data spanning 1.5 years allows us to gain an understanding of the longitudinal process 
underlying consumer decision-making in the presence of the aforementioned signals.  While prior work 
has considered process characteristics of this form, it has done so with comparatively limited scope, 
examining, for instance, how the behavior of one reviewer will influence that of subsequent reviewers 
(Forman et al. 2008; Schlosser 2005).  Our examination has thus allowed us to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the influence that multiple signals have on contributor decisions, in tandem.  These 
effects are rather complex, and suggest that users consideration of such signals (e.g., relying on them to 
different degrees and in different ways in different scenarios) may be highly dependent upon context.  For 
example, in the marketplace we have examined, one might infer from our results that users are concerned 
with providing fair consideration to all projects and ensuring the public good is met.  It appears that they 
do this by attempting to “correct” or “address” lower contribution frequencies and higher contribution 
densities. Conversley, they withdraw their own funds in response to greater contribution frequencies and 
lower contribution densities. 
The role of social influence (i.e., information on others’ contribution behavior) in private contributions 
toward public goods has been examined in the past. The work by Borck et al. (2006), which dealt with 
funding of an online newsletter, and the work by Shang and Croson’s (2009), which dealt with 
contributions toward a public service radio station, identified effects that are the opposite of those 
presented here (i.e., they find evidence of positive reinforcement). There are a number of potential 
reasons for this contrast. In particular, Shang and Croson’s (2009) field experiment considered 
contributors’ monetary donations made over the phone, thus it examined a setting in which contributors 
were under direct observation by another party and were prompted with the details of another 
contributor’s donation amount, prior to making their own contribution decision. It is therefore possible 
that the consideration of another, specific individual’s contribution has profoundly different effect from 
the consideration of contributions made by a broader community or population. If a potential contributor 
believes that other contribution amounts vary widely, they may feel more at ease in holding back support. 
Prior work has also noted that public good contributions tend to fall as the number of contributors grows, 
because observation of specific individuals becomes more difficult (Carpenter 2007). As contributors in 
an online setting are provided with a greater degree of anonymity, this effect is likely to be even more 
extreme. These concepts intuitively lead to a number of implications for the design and management of 
crowd-funded markets, particularly those that deal with the funding and provision of public goods such as 
online journalism. We therefore elaborate upon these ideas in the following section. 
Implications for Practice 
Our finding that the volume of pitch views is directly associated with greater contribution has an intuitive 
implication: the crowd-funding platform should seek to foster as much exposure as possible to draw in 
greater volumes of potential contributors. The same is implied by our finding of a positive effect from 
website referrals. However, some of our findings do not have such obvious implications. In particular, 
how should a crowd-funding platform present preference indicators (i.e., where and in what level of 
detail)? Based on the above discussion, the platform might instigate greater contribution by providing 
contributors with details on contributions made by similar others, based, for example, on geographic 
location or tenure in the marketplace. The availability of a direct comparator, rather than aggregate 
contribution information, could serve to mitigate this substitutive effect. 
Further, if the crowd-funding platform wished to mitigate the identified substitutive effect, it is important 
to consider the findings of associated work that has examined different approaches to boosting 
contribution toward public goods. A number of studies have explored experimental treatments to 
increasing individuals’ contribution amounts. List and Lucking-Reiley (2002) consider two such 
treatments: subsidization and the offering of refunds. These authors find that both such approaches 
successfully increase contribution levels. With this in mind, a reasonable suggestion would then seem to 
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be for the crowd-funding platform to subsidize contributions and/or seed projects with start-up funds8. 
However, the effects of subsidization can likely be improved if a more nuanced approach is taken.  
Prior work has found that different types of contributors are more or less susceptible to information on 
contributions made by prior others when making their own decisions. In particular, Shang and Croson 
(2009) found that first-time contributors are more likely to positively reinforce the contributions of others 
than repeat contributors, because first-time contributors are faced with a greater degree of uncertainty or 
ambiguity. With this in mind, providing subsidies to mitigate the substitutive effect might work best if 
targeted at one type of contributor versus another. First time contributors could be targeted with an 
initial, one time account credit upon registering with the marketplace, whereas matching contributors’ 
donations in general could be a strategy to target repeat-contributors. 
It is also important to consider the underlying psychological effect that drives the positive influence of 
subsidization and seeding on individuals’ willingness to contribute. In work related to the idea of 
subsidizing or seeding contributions toward a public good, Falk (2004) finds that supplying potential 
contributors with a small gift amplifies the amount they are willing to contribute toward a charity, as it 
incites reciprocal behavior. Returning to the notion of impure altruism and the warm glow effect 
(Andreoni 1998), where contributors receive some utility from aiding others, the influence of 
subsidization that is identified in the above work may in fact result from individuals’ perception that the 
subsidy is a type of gift to them, as it amplifies their contribution. Further, with this in mind, it is 
therefore possible that the initial gift need not be monetary in nature to achieve the same outcome. So, 
perhaps if the crowd-funding platform were to provide other types of gifts to potential contributors, this 
might serve to boost contribution levels. For example, the platform might consider offering free 
merchandise associated with the platform brand. 
Limitations & Future Work 
While our paper empirically supports the notion of the substitutive effects of contribution toward public 
goods, providing some practical evidence in a real-world setting of a phenomenon that has been examined 
at length via simulation and laboratory experiments (e.g., Carpenter 2007; Eckel 2008), our findings are 
subject to a few limitations. First, whether this consideration takes place consciously or inadvertently is 
not something we are able to identify with the data at hand. Further, we are unable to determine 
conclusively whether the identified substitutive effect is ultimately associated with free riding behavior as 
our data set does not allow us to determine exactly who reads the stories upon their publication, nor 
whether these individuals were part of the body of contributors.  
Generalizability may also prove difficult, as the target of the contribution is somewhat subjective in terms 
of its quality, being a form of ‘art’ and experience good. Future research could therefore build on our 
analysis by using data on funding and project outcomes from other crowd-funded markets that deal with 
other types of projects, such as technological inventions. Future research can also explore the relationship 
between popularity indicators, behavioral signals and more traditional, explicit forms of investor or 
purchaser preference (e.g., online product reviews) in the prediction of subsequent sales performance 
(Archak et al. 2011). Another interesting possibility here is that information processing in the funding 
stage might directly reflect the ultimate sentiment of the market once the project is implemented. As the 
details of a project’s funding status capture the frequency and intensity of contribution, this status might 
be a useful proxy for the amount of attention the project received in the funding stage (i.e., whether it 
received due diligence in evaluation), as well as the intensity of commitment that funders made to the 
project (i.e., the funders’ willingness to pay for the project). Logically speaking, it seems likely that 
projects should perform better if they receive a more careful evaluation by the funding community. 
Similarly, projects should perform better if they are perceived to be more valuable by the funding 
community.  
                                                             
8 It is interesting to note here that the marketplace intermediary in our study context began doing this 
after the point of our data collection. 
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Conclusion 
This work presents a holistic analysis of the process of consumer decision-making in a crowd-funding 
context. Drawing on rich set of contribution and web traffic data from a crowd-funded marketplace for 
online journalism projects, we have found evidence suggesting that individuals rely on different forms of 
information reflecting the preferences of marketplace members when making their contribution 
decisions. Our finding that individuals reallocate their contributions in response to greater contributions 
by others is in line with models of impure altruism or the warm glow effect (Andreoni 1998). A further 
implication of this behavior is that individuals in this marketplace may free ride on the contributions of 
others. Bearing the identified substitutive effect in mind, we have also identified some strategies that a 
crowd-funding platform might undertake to overcome this reallocation behavior, boosting individual 
contributions.  
We have presented one of the first empirical attempts to understand the influence and implications of 
popularity (preference) indicators in crowd-funded marketplaces. With the emergence of “crowd-funding” 
as a viable business model, such marketplaces are providing users with the opportunity to express 
themselves in new ways, and to examine others’ behavior in new ways. The nascent body of literature on 
crowd-funding will likely benefit greatly from further consideration of these types of signals.  
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